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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 890510-CA

v.
Category No. 2

DARWIN MECHAM,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of distribution of
a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989), and of
distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989),
in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Dennis L.
Draney, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Was the taped phone conversation between defendant

and a confidential informant properly admitted into evidence at
trial?
2.

Was a tape recording offered by defendant properly

excluded from evidence at trial?

3.

Did the trial court properly instruct the jury with

regard to testimony of the confidential informant?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-4(7)(a) (Supp. 1989) 1 :
A person acting under color of law may
intercept a wire, electronic, or oral
communication if that person is a party to
the communication or one of the parties to
the communication has given prior consent to
the interception.
Utah R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Darwin Mecham, was convicted of two counts
of distribution of a controlled substance after a jury trial (R.
54, 59). Defendant was sentenced to indeterminate terms at the
Utah State Prison of zero to five years on the third degree
felony and one to fifteen years on the second degree felony, said
sentences to run concurrently (R. 68). Defendant filed his
notice of appeal on August 8, 1989.
At trial the tape recording between the confidential informant
and defendant was received into evidence pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 77-23A-4(2)(H)[sic] (R. 94). That section had been
superceded by Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-4(7)(a) (Supp. 1989),
effective April 24, 1989, prior to the trial date of June 23,
1989. Nevertheless, pursuant to Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be
disregarded." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-30(a) (1982) (Repealed eff.
July 1, 1990). The difference between the prior and existing
statutes are substantively insignificant and do not affect the
substantial rights of the defendant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of July 2, 1988, Sgts. Jerry Foote of
the Duchesne County Sheriff's Office and Wayne Embleton of the
Roosevelt City Police met Patrick Murphy at the Roosevelt Police
Station to arrange a marijuana buy from defendant (R. 88).
Several nights prior to that night Mr. Murphy had been caught by
Sgt. Foote with some stolen aluminum and offered to help the
police in exchange for not being prosecuted (R. 88, 103-05, 115).
On July 2 Mr. Murphy made a phone call to defendant
from the police station and arranged the marijuana buy.

That

call was tape recorded with Mr. Murphy's knowledge and approval,
and Sgt. Foote was present during the call (R. 89-90, 113-14,
140).

Defendant, followed and observed by the officers,

purchased marijuana from defendant (R. 114-17).

On July 11,

1988, Mr. Murphy made another purchase from defendant, with Sgt.
Foote and Roosevelt Police Chief Cecil Gurr present and observing
the transaction, this time made in front of Mr. Murphy's home (R.
148-67).

In May, 1989, Mr. Murphy made statements, which were

recorded by defendant, apparently denying what he had done and
contradicting his subsequent testimony in court (R. 138, 189-91).
At trial the court admitted into evidence, pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23A-4(2)(H) [sic], the tape of the phone
conversation between Mr. Murphy and defendant made at the police
station on July 2nd.

Mr. Murphy testified that the tape he made

in May, 1989 had been made under duress at defendant's request
after defendant had grabbed him by the throat and threatened him
(R. 138-39).

The trial court refused to admit that tape pursuant

to Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, as being a "waste of time"
and a "needless presentation of cumulative evidence" (R. 206).
Defendant requested that an instruction be given to the jury
urging that Mr. Murphy's testimony, as that of an informant, be
examined with greater caution than that of an ordinary witness
(R. 63, 244). The trial court refused to give the requested
instruction (R. 244).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted into evidence the
tape recording of the telephone conversation of July 2, 1988,
between Mr. Murphy and defendant.
The trial court properly excluded the tape recording
made in May, 1989 by Mr. Murphy at defendant's request.
The trial court adequately instructed the jury
concerning the testimony of Mr. Murphy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO
EVIDENCE THE TAPE RECORDING OF THE TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEFENDANT AND MR.
MURPHY.
Defendant argues that the tape recording of his
telephone conversation with Mr. Murphy should not have been
admitted into evidence because a court order had not been
obtained before the conversation was intercepted (Br. of App. at
5).

However, defendant offers no legal analysis to support his

contention that a court order was required before intercepting
the telephone communication between defendant and the
confidential informant.

Although defendant states that the trial

court should have applied Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a-8 and 77-23a10 rather than section 77-23a-4(2)(h) [sic] in determining the
admissibility of the taped telephone conversation, he fails to
analyze or distinguish the different statutory provisions and
provides no authority supporting his position.

Rule 24(a)(9) of

both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals states
that an appellate brief "shall contain the contentions of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented and the reasons
therefore, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on."

In State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,

1344 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court declined to rule on an
issue because the defendant had "fail[ed] to support his argument
by any legal analysis or authority."

See also State v. Wareham,

772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) ("A brief must contain some support
for each contention.

[Defendant's] brief totally fails to

provide any reasons to support [his] contention. . . .

We

therefore must disregard this issue."); State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d
512, 514 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("[A]ppellant failed to support
his contention with legal analysis or authority.
decline to rule on it.").

We therefore,

Because defendant fails to

substantively argue his position, the Court has no basis from
which to evaluate or rule on his contention.
Should this Court decide to review the merits of
defendant's argument, governing authority clearly supports the
trial court's decision to admit the tape recording into evidence.
In State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme
Court disposed of a challenge nearly identical to defendant's

here.

In that case, an undercover agent wore a "wire" which

transmitted her conversations with the defendant during a drug
transaction to fellow officers stationed outside.

The defendant

challenged the admissibility of the conversations, which were
taped, on the ground that the police did not first obtain a court
order authorizing the interception of the conversations.

In

holding that no such court order was necessary, the Court stated
that "U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23a-4(2)(b) allows the interception of
wire or oral communication by a person acting under color of law
'where the person is a party to the communication.'M

Ixi. at 759

(citations omitted).
In the instant case, Mr. Murphy clearly acting under
color of law in his capacity under an immunity agreement
authorized the taping of his phone conversation with defendant
(R. 113). That tape was properly admitted into evidence.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED DEFENDANT'S
PROFFERED EVIDENCE.
Defendant argues that the trial court's exclusion of a
tape recording was an abuse of discretion and a denial of his
right to cross examine under the Utah and federal constitutions.
In making his argument, defendant fails to support his contention
by any legal analysis or authority.

As discussed supra, that

failure gives this Court no basis from which to evaluate or rule
on his position, and this Court may decline to address his
argument.

See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d at 1344.
Should this Court entertain defendant's argument,

governing authority supports the trial court's exclusion of

defendant's proffered evidence pursuant to Utah R. of Evid. 403.
Here, the trial court denied defendant's motion to admit the
evidence in question as a "waste of time" and a "needless
presentation of cumulative evidence under Rule 403" (R. 206). An
evidentiary ruling under Rule 403 will not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
P.2d 415, 419 (Utah 1989).

State v. Larson, 775

To constitute an abuse of discretion

the error must have been harmful. Jd.

Errors are labeled

"harmless" when the appellate court concludes that there was "no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings."

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989).

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to admit the tape recording in question.

Mr. Murphy,

who spoke on the tape in question testified repeatedly that he
had done so under duress after having been threatened by
defendant (R. 123, 138-39).

He testified that what he had said

on the tape was contrary to his testimony at trial and that he
had lied while speaking on that tape (R. 138, 140). Two other
witnesses, present at the time the tape was made, testified to
the fact that Murphy said things on the tape contrary to his incourt testimony (R. 184, 188). Moreover, an expert from the
Weber State College crime lab testified that several electrical
disturbances were in the tape itself and concluded that it was
highly likely that material had been removed from the tape
recording (R. 196-97).

All witnesses testified before the jury.

The testimony, as to the tape's content (i.e. contrary to
Murphy's testimony at trial), the circumstances surrounding the

tape's preparation, and its inherent unreliability due to
possible tampering all amply support the trial court's Rule 403
ruling.

Even if the trial court erred in failing to admit the

tape recording, there is no reasonable likelihood that it in any
way affected the outcome of the proceedings,
With regard to defendant's assertions that he was
denied his constitutional right to cross examine, defendant fully
cross examined Mr. Murphy at trial, including extensive
questioning concerning the tape recording in question.

No error

exists.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY CONCERNING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
IMMUNIZED WITNESS.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing
to give the following instruction to th€? jury:
You have heard the testimony that Patrick
Murphy, received a benefit from the
government in connection with this case. You
should examine Patrick Murphy's testimony
with greater caution than that of ordinary
witnesses. In evaluating that testimony, you
should consider the extent to which it may
have been influenced by the receipt of
benefits from the government.
(R. 63). Instead, the trial court gave the following instruction
(Instruction 14):
If you believe any witness has willfully
testified falsely, as to any material fact in
the case, you are at liberty to disregard the
whole of the testimony of such witness,
except as he may have been corroborated by
other credible witnesses or credible
evidence. You are not bound to believe all
that the witnesses may have testified to nor
are you bound to believe any witness; you may
believe one witness against many, or many as

against one.
observations,
the weight to
witnesses and
are.

In
it
be
to

the light of the above
is your privilege to judge
given the testimony of the
determine what the facts

In weighing the testimony of any witnessf
you may take into consideration their [sic]
interest in the matter and give their [sic]
testimony the same fair and impartial
consideration you are obliged to give to all
of the evidence in the case.
(R. 54).
In support of his position, defendant cites State v.
Sdhreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986), stating that the Utah
Supreme Court in that case held that a proper jury instruction
would state that certain persons had been granted immunity and
that the jury should view their testimony "with the utmost,
scrutiny and caution" (Br. of App. at 7).
Court's holding was to the contrary.

In reality, the

The jury instruction quoted

by defendant was the one proposed by the defendant there and
refused by the trial court.

The Supreme Court held that the

trial court did not err in refusing to give the "utmost scrutiny
and caution" instruction and stated that "a grant of immunity
from other crimes does not require a specific instruction that
the immunized witness's testimony should be viewed with
suspicion."

State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d at 1221. The Court

also noted with approval the trial court's employment of two more
general instructions concerning weighing bias, interest and other
factors in evaluating a witness's testimony.

Id.

While the defendant here has not proposed that the
immunized witness's testimony be viewed with "suspicion," a
standard which can be applicable to uncorroborated accomplice
-Q-

testimony, Schreuder, 726 P.2d at 1221 (citing State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982)), he has
requested that "greater caution" be used in the jury's evaluation
of that testimony.
In State v. Vaughn, 554 P.2d 210 (Utah 1976), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the precise issue in dispute here.
There, the defendant challenged the trial court's failure to give
jury instructions as to the credibility of a witness who had been
granted immunity.

In upholding the trial court's ruling, the

Court stated that "generally such instructions are addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, which rule is applicable
to witnesses generally, including those expecting immunity or
having been employed to seek out evidence."

Id., at 211. As

noted supra, a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless
its error is harmful.

See State v. Larson, 775 P.2d at 419.

In the instant case, the trial court gave a general
instruction informing the jury members that they could take into
consideration a witness's interest in the matter.
instruction alone is adequate.

That

Even if the trial court should

have used defendant's requested instruction, its failure to do so
constitutes harmless error.

The matter of .Mr. Murphy's interest

in the case was before the jury due to extensive cross
examination of Murphy and the police officers involved in the
matter.

Moreover, Murphy testimony was corroborated by three

police officers, including the Chief of Police of Roosevelt,
Utah.

Defendant offered no testimony or evidence rebutting the

facts of the transaction in question as testified to by the

-10-

prosecution witnesses.

Even if the trial court erred in failing

to give defendant's proposed instruction, the error would be
harmless.

There is "no reasonable likelihood that the error

affected the outcome of the proceedings."

State v. Verde, 770

P.2d at 120.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons defendant's conviction should
be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this _ _ £ _ day of March, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
^JtlblTK S. H. ATHERTON
^Aj^sistant Attorney General
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